Dictator games in the lab and in nature: External validity tested and investigated in Ugandan primary schools

Abigail Barr and Andrew Zeitlin

No 2010-11, CSAE Working Paper Series from Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford

Abstract: This paper tests the external validity of a simple Dictator Game as a laboratory analogue for a naturally occurring policy-relevant decision-making context. In Uganda, where teacher absenteeism is a problem, primary school teachers’ allocations to parents in a Dictator Game are positively but weakly correlated with their time allocations to teaching and, so, negatively correlated with their absenteeism. Guided by a simple theoretical model, we find that the correlation can be improved by allowing for (a) variations in behavioural reference points across teachers and schools and (b) the positive effect if some School Management Committees on teacher attendance.

Keywords: Public service; Education; Experiments; Africa; external validity; Methodology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 I29 O15 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-cbe, nep-dev, nep-exp and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csa:wpaper:2010-11

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