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In-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in naturally occurring groups

Klaus Abbink and Donna Harris

No 2019-02, CSAE Working Paper Series from Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford

Abstract: We study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a novel multiplayer dictator game in a naturally occuring setting. An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of around 20 recipients each and to Self. The groups are supporters of two rival political movements in Thailand and politically neutral subjects. The non-rival out-group as a reference point allows us to measure in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination. A treatment with artificial groups serves as a control. We find both in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination among the naturally occurring groups. In artificial groups, favouritism is observed, but not discrimination. Our results suggest that the two behaviours are not driven by the same motive, and only when groups are in conflict out-group discrimination is likely to occur.

Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-sea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Journal Article: In-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in naturally occurring groups (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: In-group favouritism and out-group discimination in naturally occurring groups (2012) Downloads
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