In-group favouritism and out-group discimination in naturally occurring groups

Donna Harris and Klaus Abbink

No 616, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game. An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of 20 recipients each and Self. Allocations to groups are divided equally among the group members. The three groups are supporters of the two rival political movements in Thailand (“yellow shirts†versus “red shirts†) and political neutral subjects. A control treatment with artificial groups (“group A†, “group B†, and “non-affiliated†) is also conducted. We find that allocators strongly favour their own group and discriminate against supporters of the rival party. Despite a strong anti-corruption stance of the yellow-shirt movement members of both political groups are indistinguishable in both favouritism and discrimination. Allocators tend to be rather selfish: on average 45% of the pie is given to Self, despite the large number of recipients.

Keywords: In-group favouritism; Out-group discrimination; Corruption; In-group; Out-group; Political conflict; Experimental design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D73 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: In-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in naturally occurring groups (2019)
Working Paper: In-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in naturally occurring groups (2019)
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