EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The Political Economy of Economic Policy Advice

Stefan Dercon

No 2023-09, CSAE Working Paper Series from Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford

Abstract: This paper examines the political economy of economic policy advice. It offers a framework for assessing how to maximize the economic development impact of advice, allowing for the political incentives of those in power. It argues for a ’second best’ analysis that looks to maximize development impact given political incentives and shows how standard advice, as often given by researchers or by advisors in government or from international organisations such as World Bank and IMF may not be this second best. Furthermore, it looks at the implications of treating political constraints as endogenous. Some examples illustrate how research and advice can be more impactful taking into account local political economy conditions.

Keywords: economics; Africa; political economy; policy advice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:11bf00de-823e-41a0-8d31-84b2b58b0d8b (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csa:wpaper:2023-09

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CSAE Working Paper Series from Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Julia Coffey ().

 
Page updated 2024-04-18
Handle: RePEc:csa:wpaper:2023-09