The Political Economy of Economic Policy Advice

Stefan Dercon

Journal of African Economies, 2024, vol. 33, issue Supplement_2, ii26-ii38

Abstract: This article examines the political economy of economic policy advice. It offers a framework for assessing how to maximise the economic development impact of advice, allowing for the political incentives of those in power. It argues for a ‘second best’ analysis that looks to maximise development impact given political incentives and shows how standard advice often given by researchers, government advisors or international organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF may not be this second best option. Furthermore, it looks at the implications of treating political constraints as endogenous. Some examples illustrate how research and advice can be more impactful by considering local political economy conditions.

Keywords: policy advice; economics; political economy; Africa JEL codes: P00; N90; H12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jae/ejae027 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jafrec:v:33:y:2024:i:supplement_2:p:ii26-ii38.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of African Economies is currently edited by Francis Teal

More articles in Journal of African Economies from Centre for the Study of African Economies Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().