Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Paola Conconi, Giovanni Facchini and Maurizio Zanardi

No 246, Development Working Papers from Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano

Abstract: Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions and the implications of this institutional procedure for trade negotiations. We describe a simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across constituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive, while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We show that legislators� FTA voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their own constituencies as well as those of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the determinants of all FTA votes between 1974 (when fast track was first introduced) and 2002 (when it was last granted) provides strong support for the predictions of our model.

Keywords: Fast Track Authority; Trade Negotiations; Strategic Delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50
Date: 2008-04-15
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations (2012)
Working Paper: Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations (2012)
Working Paper: Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations (2008)
Working Paper: Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csl:devewp:246

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