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Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Paola Conconi (), Giovanni Facchini () and Maurizio Zanardi ()

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2012, vol. 4, issue 3, 146-89

Abstract: We develop a simple model of trade relations in which legislators with different stakes in import-competing and export industries decide whether to grant fast-track authority (FTA) to the president, giving up the power to amend international trade agreements. We show that strategic delegation motives are key to understanding FTA votes, which involve a decision between alternative country representatives: the executive or the majority in Congress. We then examine the determinants of all votes by US congressmen on FTA since the introduction of this institutional procedure in 1974. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for the predictions of the model. (JEL D72, F12, F13)

JEL-codes: D72 F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.4.3.146
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Working Paper: Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations (2008) Downloads
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