Electoral Cycle Bias in the Media Coverage of Corruption News
Marco Le Moglie () and
Gilberto Turati ()
No def069, DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza from Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE)
We investigate the existence of an `electoral cycle bias' in the timing of media coverage of news with high political value. In particular, we analyze how the electoral cycles at the regional level in uence the coverage of news about corruption scandals in the Italian Regional Health Systems by two important national newspapers having opposite ideology, La Repubblica (left-wing oriented) and Il Giornale (right-wing oriented). Our findings show that Il Giornale produces more articles about corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians in the days right before the elections, while it reduces the number of those about right episodes of corruption and without any political connection. Instead, for La Repubblica we do not find any evidence of the existence of neither an electoral cycle, nor an ideological bias in the coverage of corruption. These results are robust to different model specifications, the potential endogeneity of some elections, and different measures of the time to the elections.
Keywords: media; media bias; electoral cycle; ideology; corruption scandals; health system; Italian regions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H51 H75 K42 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def069.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Electoral cycle bias in the media coverage of corruption news (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctc:serie1:def069
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza from Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Simone Moriconi ().