Centralized Course Allocation
Matteo Triossi () and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina ()
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
We present the renegotiable acceptance mechanism in the context of the multi-unit assignment problem. This mechanism combines features of the immediate and deferred acceptance mechanisms and implements the set of stable matchings in both Nash and undominated Nash equilibria under substitutable priorities. In addition, we prove that under slot-specific priorities, the immediate acceptance mechanism also implements the set of stable matchings in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria. Finally, we present modifications of both mechanisms and show that we can dramatically reduce the complexity of the message space when preferences are responsive.
Keywords: renegotiable; acceptance; immediate; acceptance; multi-unit; assignment; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:27388
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