Centralized Course Allocation

Antonio Romero-Medina and Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

No 340, Documentos de Trabajo from Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile

Abstract: We present the renegotiable acceptance mechanism in the context of the multi-unit assignment problem. This mechanism combines features of the immediate and deferred acceptance mechanisms and implements the set of stable matchings in both Nash and undominated Nash equilibria under substitutable priorities. In addition, we prove that under slot-specific priorities, the immediate acceptance mechanism also implements the set of stable matchings in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria. Finally, we present modifications of both mechanisms and show that we can dramatically reduce the complexity of the message space when preferences are responsive. Key words:

Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Centralized Course Allocation (2018)
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