On the cultural transmission of corruption
Esther Hauk and
María Sáez Martí
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa
Abstract:
We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that under reasonable parameters the economy has two steady states which differ in their levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium se1ection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the initial distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about policies in the future. We propose sorne policy interventions which via parents' efforts have long lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. We argue that our model exp1ains the differecnes which are observed across countries with similar degrees of economic development and that educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully.
Keywords: Corruption; Cultural; transmission; Overlapping; generations; Principal-agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... 6a44bcbbed97/content (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption (2002) 
Working Paper: On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption (2001) 
Working Paper: On the cultural transmission of corruption (1999) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:4143
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().