On the cultural transmission of corruption

Esther Hauk and Maria Saez-Marti

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via parents' efforts have long-lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully.

Keywords: Dynamics of corruption; education; formation of preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 K42 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption (2002)
Working Paper: On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption (2001)
Working Paper: On the cultural transmission of corruption (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:392

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