The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information

Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Diego Moreno (diego.moreno@uc3m.es)

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We study the Mas-Collel bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which each trader has the "joint information» of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the associated economy.

Keywords: Atomless; exchange; economies; Differential; information; Bargaining; set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02
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Journal Article: The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:6120

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