Economics at your fingertips  

The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information

Ezra Einy (), Diego Moreno () and Benyamin Shitovitz ()
Additional contact information
Ezra Einy: Department of Economics, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, 84105 ISRAEL
Benyamin Shitovitz: Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Haifa, 31905 ISRAEL

Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 18, issue 2, 473-484

Abstract: We study the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which each trader has the "joint information" of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the associated economy.

Keywords: General equilibrium in large exchange economies with differential information; Weak fine bargaining set; Core; Value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 D82 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-05-08
Note: Received: February 15, 1999; revised version: August 9, 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

Page updated 2020-03-29
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:473-484