Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems

Jose Alcalde
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically faced with this mechanism. We also provide a second mechanism to implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.

Keywords: Matching; markets; college; admissions; problems; mechanism; design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems (2000)
Working Paper: Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:6124

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