Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems

Jose Alcalde and Antonio Romero-Medina
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Antonio Romero-Medina: University of California-Riverside
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: This paper provides three simple mechanisms to implement allocations in the core of matching markets. We analyze some sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically faced with these mechanisms. Two mechanisms implement the core correspondence in SPE, whereas the third implements the students' optimal stable solution.

Keywords: College admissions problems; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1996-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1996-13.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1996 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems (2000)
Working Paper: Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1996-13

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