Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem

Jose Alcalde
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: This paper studies sequential mechanisms which mimic a matching procedures for many-to-one real life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing the students' optimal allocation in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.

Keywords: Matching; markets; College; admission; problems; Mechanism; design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... ff9c0ae67ce2/content (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem (2005)
Working Paper: - SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:6126

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().