- SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM

Jose Alcalde and Antonio Romero Medina

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: This paper studies the sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures formany-to-one-real-life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing thestudent´ optimal allocation in subgame perfect equibrium.

Keywords: Matching; Implementation; Mechanism Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1999-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published by Ivie

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1999-16.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1999 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem (2005)
Working Paper: Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1999-16

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