On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly

Francesco De Sinopoli
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

Date: 2002-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly (2005)
Working Paper: On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we025620

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