On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly
Francesco De Sinopoli and
Giovanna Iannantuoni ()
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.
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Journal Article: On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly (2005)
Working Paper: On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we025620
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