On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly

Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni (giovanna.iannantuoni@unimib.it)

CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

Keywords: Plurality Rule; Regular Equilibria; Stable Sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 2003-12-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly (2005)
Working Paper: On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly (2002)
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