Uniform continuity of the value of zero-sum games with differential information

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko and Benyamin Shitovitz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Diego Moreno ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We establish uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information, when the distance between changing information fields of each player is measured by the Boylan (1971) pseudo-metric. We also show that the optimal strategy correspondence is upper semicontinuous when the information fields of players change, even with the weak topology on players' strategy sets.

Date: 2004-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... f5294b0079b1/content (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Uniform Continuity of the Value of Zero-Sum Games with Differential Information (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we041603

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().