Uniform continuity of the value of zero-sum games with differential information
Ezra Einy and
Diego Moreno ()
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
We establish uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information, when the distance between changing information fields of each player is measured by the Boylan (1971) pseudo-metric. We also show that the optimal strategy correspondence is upper semicontinuous when the information fields of players change, even with the weak topology on players' strategy sets.
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Journal Article: Uniform Continuity of the Value of Zero-Sum Games with Differential Information (2008)
Working Paper: Uniform Continuity of the Value of Zero-Sum Games with Differential Information (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we041603
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