Uniform Continuity of the Value of Zero-Sum Games with Differential Information
Diego Moreno () and
No 2007-02, Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
We establish uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information, when the distance between changing information fields of each player is measured by the Boylan (1971) pseudo-metric. We also show that the optimal strategy correspondence is upper semi-continuous when the information fields of players change (even with the weak topology on players' strategy sets), and is approximately lower semi-continuous.
Keywords: Zero-Sum Games; Differential Information; Value; Op-timal Strategies; Uniform Continuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 p.
Note: Revised version of Discussion Paper # 04-04 of Monaster Center for Economic Research, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.
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Journal Article: Uniform Continuity of the Value of Zero-Sum Games with Differential Information (2008)
Working Paper: Uniform continuity of the value of zero-sum games with differential information (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:econdp:2007-02
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