Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule

Aloisio Araujo, Luciano de Castro and Humberto Moreira ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: Discontinuous games, such as auctions, may require special tie-breaking rules to guarantee equilibrium existence. The best results available ensure equilibrium existence only in mixed strategy with endogenously defined tie-breaking rules and communication of private information. We show that an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is sufficient for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in a class of auctions. The rule is explicitly defined and does not require communication of private information. We also characterize when special tie-breaking rules are really needed.

Date: 2006-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we065924

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