Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule

Aloisio Araujo, Luciano de Castro and Humberto Moreira ()

Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 35, issue 3, 407-440

Keywords: Auctions; Pure strategy equilibria; Non-monotonic bidding functions; Tie-breaking rules; Necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium; Multidimensional types; C62; C72; D44; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule (2006)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0249-0

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