Electing a parliament

Francesco De Sinopoli and Leo Ferraris ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We present a model where a society elects a parliament by voting for candidates belonging to two parties. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single-district proportional. In this framework, the policy outcome is simply a function of the number of seats parties take in the election. We prove that in both systems there is a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. Finally, we compare the outcomes in the two systems.

Keywords: Majority; election; Proportional; election; Perfect; equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Electing a parliament (2013)
Working Paper: Electing a Parliament (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we073319

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