Electing a Parliament
Francesco De Sinopoli,
Leo Ferraris () and
Giovanna Iannantuoni ()
No 150, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics
Abstract:
We present a model where a society elects a parliament by voting for candidates belonging to two parties. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single-district proportional. In this framework, the policy outcome is simply a function of the number of seats parties take in the election. We prove that in both systems there is a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. Finally, we compare the outcomes in the two systems.
Keywords: Majority election; Proportional election; Perfect equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2008-12, Revised 2008-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper150.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Electing a parliament (2013) 
Working Paper: Electing a parliament (2007) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:150
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matteo Pelagatti ().