Games of capacities: a (close) look to Nash Equilibria

Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: The paper studies two games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets. The focus is on the stability of Nash equilibrium outcomes. We provide minimal necessary and sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria and the stability of outcomes.

Keywords: Stable; matchings; Capacity; Nash; Equilibrium; Cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (2011)
Working Paper: Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria (2011)
Working Paper: Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we075933

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