Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria

Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: Studying the interaction between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove that acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees the stability of a Nash equilibrium and the strategy-proofness of truthful capacity revelation under the hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable rules. We then introduce generalized capacity manipulations games where hospitals move first and state their capacities, and interns are subsequently assigned to hospitals using a sequential mechanism. In this setting, we first consider stable revelation mechanisms and introduce conditions guaranteeing the stability of the outcome. Next, we prove that every stable non-revelation mechanism leads to unstable allocations, unless restrictions on the preferences of the agents are introduced

Keywords: Stable; matching; Capacity; Nash; equilibrium; Cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (2013)
Working Paper: Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria (2011)
Working Paper: Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria (2007)
Working Paper: Games of capacities: a (close) look to Nash Equilibria (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we1125

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