An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups

Haydée Lugo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Cabrales

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-best levels.

Keywords: Lotteries; Public; good; Warm; glow; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 H21 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... 594fa14c86e3/content (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups (2011)
Working Paper: An impure public good model with lotteries in large grou (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we1107

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().