An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups

Haydée Lugo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Cabrales

No 8319, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-best levels.

Keywords: Efficiency; Lotteries; Public good; Warm glow (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 H21 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups (2011)
Working Paper: An impure public good model with lotteries in large grou (2011)
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