The value of public information in common value Tullock contests

Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Diego Moreno ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We study how changes in the information available to the players of a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information affect their payoffs and their incentives to exert effort. For the class of contests where players' state dependent cost of effort is multiplicative, we show that if the players' Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is increasing (decreasing), then the value of Public information is positive (negative). Moreover, if players' cost of effort (value) is state independent, then players' effort decreases (increases) with the level of information.

Keywords: Tullock; contests; Common; values; Value; of; public; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-sog
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Related works:
Journal Article: The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests (2017)
Working Paper: The Value of Public Information in Common-Value Tullock Contests (2014)
Working Paper: The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we1401

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