The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests

Benyamin Shitovitz () and Diego Moreno ()
Additional contact information
Benyamin Shitovitz: University of Haifa, Department of Economics, http://hevra.haifa.ac.il/econ

No WP2017/7, Working Papers from University of Haifa, Department of Economics

Abstract: Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players’ cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow–Pratt curvature of d, Rd , determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/ reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If Rd is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if Rd is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive).

Keywords: Tullock; contests; ·; Common; values; ·; Value; of; public; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hevra.haifa.ac.il/econ/wp_files/wp201707.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests (2017)
Working Paper: The Value of Public Information in Common-Value Tullock Contests (2014)
Working Paper: The value of public information in common value Tullock contests (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201707

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Haifa, Department of Economics 199 Aba Khoushy Ave., Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel, 3498838. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anna Rubinchik ().