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Group Size and Matching Protocol in Contests

Kyung Baik (), Subhasish Chowdhury and Abhijit Ramalingam ()

No GRU_2021_020, GRU Working Paper Series from City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, Global Research Unit

Abstract: We investigate the effects of group size and matching protocol in Tullock contest experiments. In a 2x2 factorial design we implement partner and random stranger matching protocols in contests between two and between three players. Group size does not affect overall absolute bid levels, but the rate of overbidding is lower in two-player groups across matching protocols. Matching protocol does not affect bidding behavior for three-player groups, but a partner matching reduces both the level and dispersion of bids in two-player groups. These results show the joint effect of group size and matching protocol, and suggest that identifiability in repeated play facilitates tacit collusion.

Keywords: Contest; Experiment; Matching protocol; Group size; Experimental methodology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2021-05-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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https://www.cb.cityu.edu.hk/ef/doc/GRU/WPS/GRU%232021-020%20Ramalingam.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Group size and matching protocol in contests (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Group size and matching protocol in contests (2015) Downloads
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