The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements

Thierry Bréchet, Francois Gerard, Henry Tulkens and van Ypersele Jean-Pascal

No 2008038, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate agreements. We compare a minus 20 percent unilateral commitment strategy by the EU with a unilateral minus 30 percent emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate-economy simulation model, we find that carbon leakage effects are negligible. Ther EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020 if other Annex-B countries follow does not induce participation of the USA with a similar 30% reduction commitement. However, the model shows that an appropriate initial allocation of emission allowances may stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.

Keywords: Climate change; Coalition theory; Integrated assessment model; Kyoto protocol (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 H4 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2008-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements (2010)
Working Paper: The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements (2010)
Working Paper: The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements (2008)
Working Paper: The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvec:2008038

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