The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements

Thierry Bréchet, Johan Eyckmans (), Francois Gerard, Philippe Marbaix, Henry Tulkens and Jean-Pascal van Ypersele
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Philippe Marbaix: Institut d’Astronomie et de Géophysique Georges Lemaître, Université catholique de Louvain
Jean-Pascal van Ypersele: Institut d’Astronomie et de Géophysique Georges Lemaître, Université catholique de Louvain

No 2008/43, Working Papers from Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate agreements. We compare a minus 20 percent unilateral commitment strategy by the EU with a multilateral minus 30 percent emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climateeconomy simulation model, we find that carbon leakage effects are negligible. The EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020 if other Annex-B countries follow does not induce participation of the USA with a similar 30% reduction commitment. However, the model shows that an appropriate initial allocation of emission allowances may stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.

Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2008-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Climate Policy, vol. 10, 2010, pp. 148–166

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Related works:
Journal Article: The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements (2010)
Working Paper: The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements (2010)
Working Paper: The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements (2008)
Working Paper: The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements (2008)
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