Agenda Control in Coalition Formation

Francis Bloch and Stephane Rottier ()

No 1999034, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players.

Keywords: Agenda Control; Cabinet Formation; Simple Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 1999-12-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Agenda control in coalition formation (2002)
Working Paper: Agenda control in coalition formation (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:1999034

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