Agenda control in coalition formation
Stephane Rottier () and
Francis Bloch ()
Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 4, 769-788
Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players. Keywords: Government Formation, Agenda Control, Coalitional Bargaining, Finite Bargaining Rules.
Note: Received: 26 January 2001/Accepted: 31 July 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
Working Paper: Agenda control in coalition formation (1999)
Working Paper: Agenda Control in Coalition Formation (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:4:p:769-788
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355
Access Statistics for this article
Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe
More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().