The Folk Theorems For Repeated Games: A Synthesis

Jean-Pierre Benoit and Vijay Krishna

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: We present a synthesis of the various folk theorems for repeated games.

Keywords: Folk theorems; repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis (1999)
Working Paper: The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis (1996)
Working Paper: The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis (1996)
Working Paper: The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvs:starer:96-08

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