The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis
Jean-Pierre Benoit and
Vijay Krishna
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Jean-Pierre Benoit: New York University
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
We present a synthesis of the various folk theorems for repeated games using a model that accommodates both finitely and infinitely repeated games with discounting. We derive a central result for this model and show that the various folk theorems follow as a consequence. Our result encompasses theorems involving epsilon equilibria and incomplete information.
Keywords: Folk Theorems; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 1999-02-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - LaTex; prepared on IBM PC/Scientific Workplace 3.0 ; to print on HP 4; pages: 36; figures: none. December 1998 version
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Folk Theorems For Repeated Games: A Synthesis (1996)
Working Paper: The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis (1996)
Working Paper: The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis (1996)
Working Paper: The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis (1996) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9902001
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