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Some Dynamics of a Strategic Market Game with a Large Number of Agents

John H. Miller and Martin Shubik
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John H. Miller: Carnegie Mellon University

No 1037, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper is designed to combine the game theoretic investigation of the static or equilibrium properties of large strategic market games together with the investigation of some very simple dynamics, which nevertheless are sufficient to show differences between two related games, one in which both borrowing and trade take place. The role of banking reserves emerges as relevant and sensitive to the transient state dynamics. Several 100,000 player games are simulated and the behavior is constructed with the analytical prediction for the games with a continuum of agents.

Date: 1992-11
Note: CFP 881.
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Published, Journal of Economics (1994), 60(1): 1-28

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