A Model of Migration

Thomas Quint and Martin Shubik
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Thomas Quint: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://cowles.yale.edu/

No 1088, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: A simple game-theoretic model of migration is proposed, in which the players are animals, the strategies are territories in a landscape to which they may migrate, and the payoffs for each animal are determined by its ultimate location and the number of other animals there. If the payoff to an animal is a decreasing function of the number of other animals sharing its territory, we show the resultant game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE). Furthermore, this PSNE is generated via "natural" myopic behavior on the part of the animals. Finally, we compare this type of game with congestion games and potential games.

Pages: 9 pages
Date: 1994-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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