On the Number of Nash Equilibria in a Bimatrix Game

Thomas Quint and Martin Shubik

No 1089, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We show that if y is an odd integer between 1 and 2^{n} - 1, there is an n x n bimatrix game with exactly y Nash equilibria (NE). We conjecture that this 2^{n} - 1 is a tight upper for n

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1994-12
Note: CFP 958.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (1997), 26: 353-359

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