Dumb Bugs and Bright Noncooperative Players: Games, Context and Behavior

Thomas Quint, Martin Shubik and Dickey Yan
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Thomas Quint: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://cowles.yale.edu/

No 1094, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Consider a repeated bimatrix game. We define "bugs" as players whose "strategy" is to react myopically to whatever the opponent did on the previous iteration. We believe that in some contexts this is a more realistic model of behavior than the standard "supremely rational" noncooperative game player. We consider possible outcome paths that can occur as the result of bugs playing a game. We also compare how bugs fare over a suitable "universe of games," as compared with standard "Nash" players and "maximin" players.

Pages: 31 pages
Date: 1995-02
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Published in W. Albers, et.al. (eds.), Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp. 185-197

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