Some Simple Games for Teaching and Research. Part 1: Cooperative Games

Martin Shubik
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Lei Yu

No 1174, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Over many years some simple cooperative games have been considered in lectures on game theory. The games were selected in order to provide insight into various normative theories of solution to n-person games. It is suggested that the results indicate that when solutions have outcomes in common, predictability is higher than when they are apart. The core is attractive but less so when it is heavily nonsymmetric.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1998-03
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