Game Theory, Complexity and Simplicity. Part III: Critique and Prospective

Martin Shubik

No 1184, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: A discussion of some of the problems in the utilization of game theoretic solution concepts is given. It is suggested that a considerable broadening of solution concepts is called for to take into account sufficient context. Mass agent simulations appear to offer promise for some economic and societal problems.

Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1998-06
Note: CFP 967.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Complexity (1998), 3(5): 34-46

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