Cheap Talk and Co-ordination with Payoff Uncertainty

Sandeep Baliga () and Stephen Morris

No 1203, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Two players seek to co-ordinate their behavior in an incomplete information setting. We show that if each player's preferences over his opponent's action is independent of his own action or type, then cheap talk cannot expand the set of equilibrium outcomes.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1998-12
Note: CFP 1043.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (2002), 105(2): 450-468

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