Dynamic Common Agency

Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki

No 1206, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We consider a general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information. We focus on Markov perfect equilibria and characterize the equilibrium set for a refinement of the Markov perfect equilibria. Particular attention is given to the existence of a marginal contribution equilibrium where each principal receives her contribution to the coalition of agent and remaining principals. The structure of the intertemporal payoffs is analyzed in terms of the flow marginal contribution. As a byproduct, new results for the static common agency game are obtained. The general characterization results are then applied to two dynamic bidding games for a common agent: (i) multi-task allocation and (ii) job matching under uncertainty.

Keywords: Common agency; dynamic bidding; marginal contribution; markov perfect equilibrium; coalition-proof equilibrium; job matching; multi-task allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61 pages
Date: 1998-12
Note: CFP 1073.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (2003), 111(1): 23-48

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Journal Article: Dynamic common agency (2003)
Working Paper: Dynamic Common Agency (1998)
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