Preference for Information and Dynamic Consistency

Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii and Ben Polak ()
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Ben Polak: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/faculty/benjamin-polak

No 1208, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we discuss whether an intrinsic information lover (say, an anxious person) is likely to be dynamically consistent.

Keywords: Information; non-expected utility; dynamic consistency; randomization; anxiety (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1999-01
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Published in Theory and Decision (2000), 48: 263-286

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