Experimentation in Markets

Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki

No 1214, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market, and purchases of the product yield information on its true quality. We assume that the performance of the new product is publicly observable. As agents learn from the experiments of others, informational externalities arise. We determine the Markov Perfect Equilibrium prices and allocations. In a single market, the combination of the informational externalities among the buyers and the strategic pricing by the sellers results in excessive experimentation. If the new product is launched in many distinct markets, the path of sales converges to the efficient path in the limit as the number of markets grows.

Keywords: Learning; experimentation; informational externalities; dynamic oligopoly; Markov perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D43 D83 L13 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 1999-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: Experimentation in Markets (2000)
Working Paper: Experimentation in Markets (1996)
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