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Contract-Theoretic Approaches to Wages and Displacement

Wouter J. den Haan, Garey Ramey and Joel Watson
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Wouter J. den Haan: Dept. Economics, UCLA, San Diego

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Wouter Denhaan ()

No 1216, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing contracting imperfections in long-term employment relationships. We focus chiefly on limited enforceability and limited worker liquidity. Inefficient severance of employment relationships, payment of efficiency wages, the relative responses of wages and employment to business cycle shocks, and the propagation of these shocks are linked to the nature of contracting imperfections.

Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1999-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Published in Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, (May/June 1999), 81: 55-68

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Journal Article: Contract-theoretic approaches to wages and displacement (1999) Downloads
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